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Research Council’s blog, The Immanent Frame, and “The Islamic 
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The “Arab Spring” at first had nothing about it that was specifically 
“Arab” or “Muslim.” The demonstrators were calling for dignity, elec-
tions, democracy, good governance, and human rights. Unlike any Arab 
revolutionary movements of the past sixty years, they were concerned 
with individual citizenship and not with some holistic entity such as 
“the people,” the Muslim umma, or the Arab nation. The demonstrators 
referred to no Middle Eastern geopolitical conflicts, burned no U.S. or 
Israeli flags, offered no chants in favor of the main (that is to say, Is-
lamist) opposition parties, and expressed no wish for the establishment 
of an Islamic state or the implementation of shari‘a. Moreover, despite 
the Western media’s frantic quest to put a face on events by talking up 
some of the protests’ astonishingly young and modern spokespersons, 
the demonstrators produced no charismatic leaders. In short, the Arab 
Spring belied the “Arab predicament”: It simply would not follow the 
script which holds that the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict is fos-
tering an ever-growing Islamization within Arab societies, a search for 
charismatic leaders, and an identification with supranational causes.
But the demonstrators did not take power—indeed, they did not even 
try. Instead, they merely wanted to establish a new political scene. Pre-
dictably, the Egyptian and Tunisian elections brought ballot-box triumphs 
for Islamist parties. With deep roots in society, enjoying a legitimacy con-
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ferred by decades of political opposition, and defending conservative and 
religious values shared by most of the populace, Egypt’s Muslim Broth-
erhood and Tunisia’s Ennahda party were able to attract votes from well 
beyond their respective hardcore bases because they looked like credible 
parties of government. More surprising 
was the strong showing of the Salafist 
al-Nur Party in Egypt. Even allowing 
for Salafism’s rise in that country, the 
sudden transformation of an apolitical 
and informal school of thought into a 
successful political movement shows 
that no single Islamist party can claim a 
monopoly over the expression of Islam 
in the political sphere. 
In any case, the actors who have 
taken to the electoral stage and bene-
fited from the Arab Spring, whether fa-
miliar like the Islamists of the Muslim 
Brotherhood or newcomers like the Salafists, are not known for their at-
tachment to democracy. Even if they have given up talk of the “Islamic 
revolution,” they still put religion at the heart of their agenda. Islamists 
and Salafists alike deplore secularization, the influence of Western val-
ues, and the excesses of individualism. Everywhere, they seek to affirm 
the centrality of religion to national identity, and they are conservative 
in all areas except the economy. And in Egypt, as commonly happens 
with parties that are swept into power by landslide margins, they are 
tempted to think that they can dispense with the grubby business of hav-
ing to form alliances and hand out government posts equitably. And why 
should Islamists, with no democratic culture to speak of, behave like 
good democrats who believe in pluralism? 
Once the election results came in, the Western media’s enthusiasm 
faded, and headlines celebrating a democracy-friendly Arab Spring gave 
way to coverage worrying about the onset of a neoauthoritarian “Arab 
Winter.” Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Taliban were casting long shadows 
over Tunis and Cairo. Was there any obstacle to Islamization in the 
last other than the Egyptian army, whose aversion to democracy is well 
known? Was the Arab Middle East hopelessly trapped, with no better 
choices than “secular” dictatorship or “Islamic” totalitarianism?
The answer to that last question is no. Something irreversible did 
happen in the Arab Spring. Whatever ups and downs may follow, we 
are witnessing the beginning of a process by which democratization is 
becoming rooted in Arab societies. Democratization is very much a pro-
cess in this case—not a program of government implemented by deep-
dyed democrats. Comparisons with other world regions (such as Latin 
America) are difficult, since the Middle East is the only place where 
Religious tolerance was 
not the fruit of liberalism 
and the Enlightenment. 
Rather, it was the prod-
uct of grudging truces in 
savage wars of religion, 
from the Peace of Augs-
burg in 1555 to the Treaty 
of Westphalia in 1648.
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the dominant opposition consists of strongly centralized and ideological 
parties with a religious agenda. A possible comparison might be with the 
Spanish and Portuguese communist parties of the late 1970s: Like the 
Islamists of Egypt and Tunisia, they too benefited from a democratiza-
tion process that they did not trigger. Yet the Iberian communists never 
achieved the control over elected parliaments that Islamists now enjoy 
in Cairo and Tunis. Whatever their own agendas, the communist parties 
had no choice but to negotiate. 
The Islamist parties may have more power and freedom to maneuver, 
but they too will find themselves being pushed to adjust to the democ-
ratization process. The pushing will be done by the constraints and dy-
namics characteristic of the social, religious, political, and geostrategic 
fields in which these parties must operate. They may accept the demands 
of the democratization process more willingly (Ennahda) or less will-
ingly (the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), but accept them they will, or 
they will find themselves sidelined. This is not a question of who has or 
does not have a hidden agenda, or of whether Islam and democracy can 
or cannot be reconciled. 
In order to grasp what is happening in the Middle East, we must set 
aside a number of deep-rooted prejudices. First among them is the as-
sumption that democracy presupposes secularization: The democratiza-
tion movement in the Arab world came precisely after thirty years of 
what has been called the “return of the sacred,” an obvious process of 
re-Islamization of everyday life, coupled with the rise of Islamist par-
ties. The second is the idea that a democrat must also, by definition, 
be a liberal. There was no flowering of “liberal Islam” preceding the 
spread of democratic ideas in the Middle East. There are a few reformist 
religious thinkers who are lauded here and there in the West, but none 
has ever had much popular appeal in any Arab country. Conversely, 
many staunch secularists, in Tunisia for instance, are not democrats. 
They would like to repress Islamists much as the Algerian secularist 
intellectuals known as les éradicateurs did during their own country’s 
civil war in the 1990s. Moreover, fundamentalist religious actors such 
as the Islamists of Tunisia or even the Salafists of Egypt, could become 
reluctant agents of a form of specifically political secularization that 
should in no way be confused with a secularization of society.
The history of the West does not contradict these theses. Religious 
tolerance was not the fruit of liberalism and the Enlightenment. Rather, 
it was the product of grudging truces in savage wars of religion, from the 
Peace of Augsburg in 1555 to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Politics 
played a bigger role than philosophy or theology. The greatest Western 
religious reformer, Martin Luther, was far from a model of democracy, 
tolerance, or liberalism (to say nothing of his anti-Semitism). The link 
between Protestantism and democratization is not a matter of theological 
propositions, but of complex political and social processes. The Founding 
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Fathers of the United States were not secularists; for them, the separation 
of church and state was a way of protecting religion from government, 
not the reverse. The French Third Republic was established in 1871 by a 
predo minantly conservative, Catholic, and monarchist parliament that had 
just crushed the Paris Commune. Christian democracy developed in Eu-
rope not because the Catholic Church wanted to promote secular values, 
but because that was the only way for it to maintain political influence. 
Finally, let us not forget that populist movements in Europe today align 
themselves with Christian democracy in calling for the continent’s Chris-
tian identity to be inscribed in the EU constitution, but few would see this 
expression of “identity politics” as an omen of Europe’s re-Christianiza-
tion. All the talk of “Islamic identity” in the wake of the Arab Spring does 
not mean that mosques will henceforth become more crowded. Religious 
identity and faith are two different (and possibly opposed) concepts in 
politics. Identity might be a way to bury faith beneath secular politics.
The Islamists as well as the Salafists are entering into a political 
space formatted by certain constraints. These constraints will not only 
limit their supposed “hidden agenda” of establishing an Islamic state, 
but will push them toward a more open and democratic way of gover-
nance, because therein lies their only chance to remain at the center of 
political life. Thus the Islamists, and even the Salafists, will become 
reluctant agents of democratization.
A World of Change
The first of these constraints has to do with demographics. As Philippe 
Fargues has shown, there has been a dramatic decline in fertility across 
the Arab world.1 In Tunisia, it has been below the French rate since the 
year 2000. Women have entered universities and the job market. Young 
people obtain more schooling than their parents did and marry later. 
Husbands and wives are more often closer to each other in age and level 
of education. They have fewer children, with nuclear families replacing 
extended households. Mobile phones, satellite television, and the Inter-
net have allowed the newer generations to associate, connect, and debate 
on a “peer-to-peer” basis rather than through a top-down, authoritarian 
system of knowledge transmission. The young feel less strongly bound 
to patriarchal customs and institutions that have been unable to cope 
with the challenges facing contemporary Middle Eastern societies.
Flowing from these changes in demographics have been changes in 
political culture. The young are more individualistic and less prone to 
feel the pull of holistic ideologies, whether Islamist or nationalist. Along 
with the decline of the patriarchal model has gone a drop in the appeal 
of charismatic leaders. The failure of political Islam that I pointed to 
twenty years ago is now obvious.2 This does not mean that Islamist par-
ties are absent from the political playing field—quite the contrary. But 
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their utopian conception of an “Islamic state” has lost credibility. Islam-
ist ideology is now finding itself challenged both by calls for democracy 
that reject any monopoly claim on power by a single party or ideology, 
and by neofundamentalist Salafists who declare that only a strict per-
sonal return to the true tenets of religious practice can serve as the basis 
of an “Islamic society.” Even among the Muslim Brothers, young mem-
bers reject blind obedience to the leadership. The new generation calls 
for debate, freedom, democracy, and good governance. 
The appeal of democracy is not a consequence of the export of the 
concept of Western democracy, as fancied by supporters of the U.S. 
military intervention in Iraq. It is the political consequence of social and 
cultural changes in Arab societies (though these changes, of course, are 
part of the globalization process). It is precisely because the Arab Spring 
is a succession of indigenous upheavals, centered on particular nation-
states and delinked from Western encroachments, that democracy is seen 
as both acceptable and desirable. This is why the ritual denunciations of 
imperialism—including the usual condemnations decrying Zionism as 
the source of all the Arab world’s troubles—were so remarkably absent 
from the demonstrations. This also explains why al-Qaeda is out of the 
picture: The uprooted global jihadist is no longer a model for young 
activists and fails to find many takers when he seeks to enlist local mili-
tants for the global cause (al-Qaeda has been expelled from Iraq by lo-
cal fighters). The only exceptions are places on the geographic fringes 
of the Arab world such as Somalia, Yemen, and the Sahel. Al-Qaeda, 
in short, is yesterday’s news, part and parcel of the old anti-imperialist 
political culture that the Arab Middle East is now leaving behind.
Of course, the social changes are not completely linear and are not 
necessarily giving rise to a “democratic mind.” Their effect is felt earli-
est, most widely, and most intensely in the big cities and among edu-
cated young people with access to the Internet. Others may feel exclud-
ed, including villagers in the Egyptian countryside, jobless urbanites 
in southern Tunisia, shopkeepers and merchants who fear that political 
tumult will hurt business, conservative milieus upset by what they see as 
sexual promiscuity among the demonstrators, and so on. 
In a word, the Arab Spring masked large reservoirs of underlying con-
servatism in Arab societies. But even some of the more conservative cor-
ners of society are becoming part of the process of individualization. A 
remarkable field study shows how villagers in Egypt ignored the Muslim 
Brothers during recent elections because the Brotherhood came across 
as too monolithic and centralized.3 These conservative religious voters 
preferred the Salafists on the grounds of what was seen as their greater 
political openness. The Salafist al-Nur Party’s recent (albeit passing) en-
dorsement of the presidential candidacy of former Muslim Brother Abdel 
Moneim Abul Futuh (who counts as a liberal in the Egyptian context) 
suggests that these villagers may have been onto something.
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Change is affecting religion, too. The Salafists, like neofundamental-
ists the world over, are recasting religion as a code and a set of clear-
cut norms disconnected from tradition and culture. They are thus best 
understood not as part of a traditionalist backlash, but as bearers of an 
attempt to adapt Islam to modernity and globalization.4 Of course, this 
adaptation should not be thought of in terms of theology (the proposi-
tional content of this or that religion), but rather in terms of religiosity 
(the way the adherent experiences his or her faith). The wave of re-
Islamization hides a very important fact: It has contributed to the diver-
sification and the individualization of the religious field. 
Islam as a theological corpus has not changed, but religiosity has. 
And this religiosity, liberal or not, is compatible with democratization 
because it delinks personal faith from traditions, collective identity, and 
external authority. The usual religious authorities (ulama and Islamist 
leaders) have largely lost their legitimacy amid the rise of self-appointed 
and often self-taught religious entrepreneurs. Young “born-again” Mus-
lims have found their own way by surfing the Internet or joining local 
peer groups. They have criticized the cultural Islam of their parents and 
have tried to construct their own brand of Islam, one that feels more 
like a matter of conviction and less like an inherited habit. Religion has 
become more and more a matter of personal choice, whether that choice 
be the strict Salafist approach to Islam or some sort of syncretism, to say 
nothing of conversion to another religion.5 
Fundamentalism and Secularism: The Secret Sharers
This individualization and diversification have had the unexpected 
consequence of disconnecting religion from daily politics, of bringing 
religion back into the private sphere and excluding it from that of gov-
ernment management. Fundamentalism, by disconnecting religion from 
culture and by defining a faith community through believing and not just 
belonging, is in fact contributing to the secularization of society.6
One of the things this means is that an apparent rejection of secular-
ization and democracy may nevertheless express “democracy-compati-
ble” patterns: individualization, refusal of blind obedience, separation 
of faith from collective identity, and a certain distance from day-to-day 
politics. In such a context, any endeavor to restore traditional norms 
through laws and regulations will fail. After all, you cannot change a 
society by decree. In Saudi Arabia, the official imposition of shari’a 
on the rapidly increasing number of “emancipated” women among the 
middle and upper classes is leading to unbearable tensions. In Iran, all 
indicators suggest that society has become more modern and secular 
under the mullahs. Although a law adopted after 1979 allows girls as 
young as nine to be taken as brides, the average age at which Iranian 
women marry has continued to rise and now stands at about 25. In short, 
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even when shari‘a is theoretically implemented, we are not seeing a 
return to a traditional society.
As we have seen, the Islamists enjoy no religious monopoly in the 
public sphere. There are other movements, such as the Sufis and the 
Salafists. This diversification is the consequence of thirty years of “re-
Islamization.” Religion’s centrality in everyday life, coupled with the 
individualization of religiosity, has given birth to a variety of religious 
movements. Some have had the encouragement of regimes eager to di-
lute the Muslim Brotherhood’s appeal. Together, their presence con-
tributes to a willy-nilly democratization of the religious field. An unex-
pected result of the Arab Spring has been that Cairo’s al-Azhar Mosque, 
one of Egypt’s most important religious institutions, has found a new 
legitimacy. The imam there, Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb, a conformist ap-
pointee of former president Hosni Mubarak, has suddenly become an 
advocate of human rights, liberty, and the separation of religious institu-
tions from the state. In Tunisia, Ennahda reached power only to discover 
that it does not control and indeed does not even know the hundreds of 
young imams who have taken over mosques abandoned by discredited 
clerics who had held their jobs courtesy of the old Ben Ali regime. 
In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers have been upset to learn that their six 
decades of steady religious and social activism have not been enough 
to stop Salafist newcomers from successfully challenging the Brother-
hood’s primacy. As a further twist, the Egyptian Salafists have been 
challenging the Brothers from the left by allying themselves with Broth-
erhood dissidents. (In Tunisia, the Salafists have lined up on Ennahda’s 
right by opposing democracy and demanding immediate implementa-
tion of shari‘a.) Among other things, this is a sign that 2011 was not 
1979 all over again—unlike the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Egypt and Tunisia are not places where some single source (the 
Muslim Brotherhood or Ennahda) can assert a right “to say what Is-
lam says.” The religious arena, too, has become pluralistic and open to 
democratic pressure, even if, for the faithful, there are some elements 
that remain nonnegotiable. 
That said, there is no agreement among religious political actors over 
what is and is not negotiable beyond the centrality of Islam. Should there 
be a body that determines whether laws are sufficiently conformable to 
Islam? If so, who ought to be nominated to it and by whom? Should 
hudud (corporal punishment) be applied in cases where religious laws 
have been violated? Is conversion to Christianity possible for a Muslim? 
It is on the question of the definition of religious liberty that we can 
expect the most vigorous debates. If the Muslim Brotherhood presents 
itself as the protector of the rights of the minority Coptic Christians in 
Egypt to practice their religion, is it ready to make religious freedom 
an individual human right (abandoning the concept of apostasy in the 
process) rather than merely the collective right of a particular historic 
12 Journal of Democracy
minority? The debate has already started. Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh, 
the Brotherhood dissident turned presidential candidate and surprising 
recipient of Salafist support, has declared that “nobody should interfere 
if a Christian decides to convert to Islam or a Muslim decides to leave 
Islam and become a Christian.”7
Whenever the implementation of Islamic religious norms comes up 
for discussion, there is an internal debate in the institutions concerned. 
Democratization has affected the community of believers, too. The 
Salafists will certainly try to raise the stakes over shari‘a and make the 
Muslim Brotherhood face up to the contradictions of its position. But 
they have also leapt into the political realm, forming parties of their own 
despite having previously challenged the very idea of political parties in 
the name of Islam. In their case, this is the compliment that vice pays to 
virtue: The Salafists know that without a parliamentary presence, they 
would lose their influence. 
All the same, the Salafists have no program other than imposing 
shari‘a, and thus are anything but a party of government, as the most re-
alistic among them well know. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salaf-
ists are fated to be rivals, and so one cannot rule out the possibility of 
their entering into unexpected alliances with other political forces.
The Failure of Political Islam 
Islamists have changed, or at least they have understood that the 
world has changed. Even where they have taken control, as in Iran or 
Gaza, they have been unable to establish a successful model of an Is-
lamic state. The gains that they have made in the wake of the Arab 
political openings are premised upon previous successes won by “oth-
ers” (in Egypt and Tunisia, democratic secularists). In earlier cases, the 
“others” have been nationalists. In Gaza, it was Palestinian nationalism, 
not political Islam, that brought Hamas (the local wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood) to power. Much the same is true for Lebanon’s Hezbollah, 
which has built its success on its opposition to Israel and its ability to 
position itself as the champion of the country’s large but traditionally 
underprivileged Shia community. 
When Islamists went to jail, they rubbed elbows with secularists and 
human-rights advocates (such as Egypt’s Saad Eddin Ibrahim). When 
they went into exile, it was more often to Europe than to Mecca. The 
Islamists came to understand the need to make alliances and to take into 
account other views. They tried to engage the West, but were too often 
rebuked. Calls for holy war and violent confrontation are the trademarks 
of countries or groups that are not friendly to these Islamists, and even 
consider them to be traitors: Iran or al-Qaeda. Implementation of shari‘a 
is the official policy of regimes and movements with which they cannot 
identify, such as Saudi Arabia or the Taliban. Charitable work aside, the 
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Islamists social agenda has slowly faded away as their constituents have 
become ever more bourgeois and entrepreneurial. The aging of their 
leadership has put them at odds with the new generation of believers. 
There is a cultural gap between the Islamists and the younger generation 
that is less about Islam per se than about what it means for a person to 
be a believer.
All these changes are pointing toward the rise of what Asef Bayat 
calls “post-Islamism.”8 This does not mean that the Islamists have dis-
appeared, but that their utopian ambitions have proved to be no match 
for existing social, political, and even geostrategic realities. There is, 
for instance, no blueprint of an “Islamic economy.” Islamists are fairly 
status quo–friendly when it comes to economic affairs, content to run 
charities in poor neighborhoods but opposing strikes and approving the 
rescinding of land reform in Egypt. The wave of religious revival that 
has swept the Muslim world did not swell their ranks, but contributed on 
the contrary to the diversification of the religious field, transforming the 
Islamists into one set of religious actors among others.
 Have the Islamists become “democrats”? They have long favored 
elections, recognizing that support for armed struggle serves jihadists 
like al-Qaeda on the one hand and repressive secular governments on 
the other, especially when the latter are eager to curry Western favor 
by posturing as the only bulwark against the “Islamist threat.” Ennah-
da’s leader Rachid al Ghannouchi has explicitly rejected the concept of 
an “Islamic state,” and cites Turkey’s Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) as a model of a post-Islamist religious-minded and conservative 
party.
Still, most Islamists are uneasy about sharing power with non-Islamic 
parties and turning their “brotherhood” organizations into modern po-
litical parties. They may, as in Morocco and Tunisia, give up formal 
support for shari‘a, but they cannot define a concrete ruling program 
that goes beyond banning alcohol, promoting the veil, or pursuing other 
petty forms of “shari‘a-fication.” After the Arab Spring, which began 
outside Islamist ranks and took Islamist leaders by surprise, the Islamists 
must choose among options. Option 1 is the Turkish model as represent-
ed by the AKP. This would mean turning the “brotherhood” into a true 
modern political party; trying to attract voters from beyond a hard core 
of devout Muslims; recasting religious norms into vaguer conservative 
values (family, property, honesty, the work ethic); adopting a neoliberal 
approach to the economy; and endorsing the constitution, parliament, 
and regular elections. 
Option 2 would be to ally themselves with “counterrevolutionary” 
forces (as in Egypt, for instance) out of fear that real democracy will 
prove too unpredictable and too hard to control. This choice would have 
large downsides, as Islamists would find themselves losing their remain-
ing legitimacy, and might wind up becoming tools of the army. A modi-
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fied form of this option would see Islamists siding with Salafists in a focus 
on certain high-profile issues (the veil and family law) while leaving other 
social and economic matters aside. Rather than ideological debate, it will 
most likely be the course of events itself that shapes what the Islamists do.
They are certainly neither secularists nor liberals, but they can be 
democrats. The convictions of political actors often play less of a role in 
shaping their policies than the constraints to which they are subject. The 
Islamists are entering an entirely new political space. Egypt and Tunisia 
did not have revolutions that replaced dictatorships with regimes that re-
sembled their predecessors. There have been elections and there is a par-
liament. Political parties have been formed and, whatever the disappoint-
ments and fears of the secular left, it will be difficult simply to close down 
this new space, because what brought it into being in the first place—a 
savvy, connected young generation and a spirit of protest—is still there. 
And experience has shown that in the Middle East, when people are of-
fered the opportunity to take part in free elections, they show up, even if 
threatened (as in Afghanistan and Iraq). Islamist movements throughout 
the region are constrained to operate in a democratic arena that they did 
not create and that has legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
Wary Voters
The Islamists must also listen to their voters, who will not follow 
them blindly. The “Islamic” electorate in Egypt or Tunisia today is not 
revolutionary; it is conservative. It wants order. It wants leaders who will 
kick-start the economy and affirm conventional religious values. It is 
not ready to plunge into reviving the caliphate or creating an Islamic re-
public. Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood know all this. They know 
that they need to attract voters because they have neither the desire nor 
the means to seize power by force. What is more, the protest movements 
in Egypt and Tunisia were not shaped by an all-encompassing ideology 
(as was the case in Iran in 1979) but by the ideals of democracy, plural-
ism, and good governance. 
Iran’s November 1979 election was held in the name of the Islamic Re-
public. The message was clear: This was an ideological revolution (even 
if there was disagreement about its complexion between the red of the 
Marxist-Leninists and the green of the Islamists). There is nothing of the 
kind in either Egypt or Tunisia. There is no revolutionary or ideological 
dynamic. It is significant, in this regard, that nowhere has the cult of the 
charismatic strongman reappeared. Instead, there are political parties and 
a new culture of debate that has influenced even the Islamists.
To impose an Islamist form of authoritarianism, the Islamists would 
need either control of the police and army or their own paramilitary 
forces, none of which they have. In Egypt and Tunisia, the army remains 
outside Islamist control (in Egypt, it may be outside anyone’s control), 
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and is not identified with the former regime the way the Imperial Ira-
nian Army was in 1979. Then too, neither Egypt nor Tunisia enjoys oil 
rents large enough to pay for placating the poor and sustaining loyal 
militias.9 Elections will really matter, and their results can be expected 
to swing back and forth for the next decade or more. Although Islamists 
tend to adopt a populist profile (talking a lot about matters of “national 
identity,” blaming Westernized elites), they may find themselves being 
outbid along these lines by demagogues who, if not “holier than thou,” 
are nonetheless “more populist than thou” and better at making populist 
appeals. 
There is one further set of constraints on both the Islamists and the 
Salafists, and these are geostrategic. Neither group has reached office 
on a platform of jihad or special support for the Palestinians. Unlike the 
Nasserite and Baathist revolutions or even Anwar Sadat’s 1974 counter-
revolution (when he opened Egypt’s economy and swapped the Soviet for 
the U.S. embrace), the Arab Spring and Winter have not turned on inter-
national questions. Neither the Brotherhood nor the Salafists have ever 
articulated a coherent supranational agenda of mobilizing the umma, in-
stead leaving attempts to politicize the concept of a transnational Islamic 
community in the bloody hands of al-Qaeda. The various branches of the 
Muslim Brothers (whether in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, or Syria) as well as 
the Islamists of the Maghreb have always had their own national agendas 
and organizations; despite their ideological proximity, they have never 
been able to devise a regional common strategy. And recent events show 
how differently they may react: The Jordanian and Tunisian Islamists are 
far more open in their alliances and in their embrace of democracy than 
the Egyptians. The national and domestic scene is where the real action is. 
If supranational dynamics do make themselves felt, moreover, they will 
only push the Islamists to change their domestic agenda in the direction of 
more democracy and moderation.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict surely retains emotional significance, 
but no one is ready to endanger geopolitical stability and economic de-
velopment for the sake of the Palestinian cause. The Islamists dislike 
Israel, and in this respect they are in step with Arab public opinion, but 
they are not willing to go to war. They have accepted the existing geo-
strategic constraints. The invitation that Tunisia’s new and democrati-
cally elected government extended to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in 
January 2012 is in line with the one that Tunisia extended to the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization after the Israelis took Beirut in 1982, and is 
evidence of continuity rather than rupture. The care that Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood has taken to open a dialogue with Western diplomats is an-
other sign that it is accepting strategic realities. The Brotherhood wants 
to remodel the relationship between Egypt and Israel, but through nego-
tiations, not confrontation. Economic constraints such as the lack of oil 
rents and the need to maintain tourism also drive the new governments 
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to want at least to appear moderate. There are projects to make tourism 
halal with gender-segregated beaches and alcohol-free resorts, but these 
seem like pipe dreams: Why should wealthy Saudis abandon Marbella 
or Beirut for a halal Sharm el-Sheikh that is just miles away from their 
own puritanically run five-star hotels?
The major conflict that is taking shape is not a clash between an Is-
lamist-led Muslim world and the West. Rather, it is the one that pits the 
conservative Sunni Arab world (whether secular, Islamist, Wahhabi, or 
Salafist) against the “Shia crescent” of which Iran is the keystone. In the 
background is Saudi Arabia’s discreet de facto alliance with Israel against 
the common Iranian threat. The crisis and fighting now raging in Syria are 
forcing regional actors to make unappetizing choices. Hezbollah is siding 
with Tehran and its client, the Assad regime in Syria. Hamas, though al-
lied with Syria and Hezbollah, has reluctantly left Damascus for Cairo, 
returning to the fold of its old family, the Sunni Muslim Brothers. Turkey, 
having been evicted from the European dream, has turned from its dashed 
hopes of full EU membership to the task of carving out a new regional 
role for itself at the head of a Sunni alliance. The AKP leaders are well 
acquainted with the Arab Islamist leaders, and a new axis is taking shape, 
bringing together similar conservative Sunni parties. The Turkish connec-
tion is also a factor of moderation for the Islamist parties. 
Of course this emerging Sunni axis antagonizes local minorities (Al-
evis in Turkey, Alawites in Syria), and accentuates tensions with the 
Shias in the Gulf (no support for the Bahraini demonstrators), in Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon, and Iraq. Yet the isolation of Iran is also a step in 
favor of stabilization and moderation. An Israeli military strike against 
Iran’s nuclear facilities will certainly trigger demonstrations in Casa-
blanca, Cairo, and Tunis. But the Arab street will probably not mobilize 
against newly elected Arab governments, which will keep a lower pro-
file than expected. Saudi Arabia, which cannot stand the concept of an 
Arab Spring, grows ever more estranged from the Islamist parties. The 
Saudis have played the Salafists against the Brothers, at least indirectly, 
but Saudis will not be able to find staunch and lasting allies among ei-
ther Tunisia’s hard-line Salafists or Egypt’s milder variety.
The bottom line is that, for the first time since the early 1950s, the 
geostrategic situation of the Middle East neither dictates domestic agen-
das nor spurs the radicalization of domestic politics—both good omens 
for the process of democratization. 
And What of Islam?
Whatever political ups and down lie ahead, whatever the diversity 
of national cases, and however intricate becomes the predictable frag-
mentation of both “democrats” and “Islamists” into various trends and 
parties, the main issue will be to redefine the role of Islam in politics. 
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The growing de facto autonomy of the religious arena from political and 
ideological control does not mean that secularism is necessarily gain-
ing ground in terms of culture and society. Yet certainly a new form of 
political secularism is emerging. Once it takes hold, religion will not 
dictate what politics should be, but will itself be reduced to politics. 
What is at stake is the reformulation of religion’s place in the public 
sphere. There is broad agreement that constitutions should announce the 
“Muslim” identity of society and the state. Yet there is similar agree-
ment on the proposition that shari‘a is not an autonomous and complete 
system of law that can replace “secular” law. Instead, shari‘a is becom-
ing a loose and somewhat hazily defined “reference point” (except in 
the realm of personal law, which means that issues of women’s rights 
will be at the core of the debate). As we saw, modern forms of religios-
ity tend to stress individual faith and choices over any sense of confor-
mity to institutional Islam. Whatever descriptive truth was left in the 
old saying “Islam admits no separation between din and dunya” (that 
is, between religion and the world) has been definitively emptied out by 
the Arab Spring. 
What we are seeing is not so much a secularization as a deconstruction 
of Islam. Is Islam a matter of cultural identity, meaning that one might 
even be an “atheist Muslim”? Is it a faith that can be shared only by born-
again believers (Salafists) in the confines of self-conscious faith com-
munities? Or is it a “horizon of meaning,” where references to shari‘a 
are more virtual than real? The recasting of religious norms into “values” 
helps also to promote an interfaith coalition of religious conservatives 
that could unite around some specific causes: opposition to same-sex mar-
riage, for instance. It is interesting to see how, in Western Europe, secu-
lar populists stress the continent’s Christian identity, while many Muslim 
conservatives try to forge an alliance with believers of other faiths to de-
fend shared values. In doing so, many of them tend to adopt Protestant 
evangelical concerns, fighting abortion and Darwinism even though these 
issues have never been prominent in traditional Islamic debates.10 
In this sense, the modern neofundamentalists are trying to recast Is-
lam into a Western-compatible kind of religious conservatism. This has 
become obvious in Turkey. In 2004, when the AKP’s Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdo¢gan unsuccessfully tried to promote a legal ban on 
adultery, the crime was defined not in terms of shari‘a, but rather by 
reference to the modern Western family (a monogamous marriage of a 
man and a woman with equal rights and duties). Interestingly, this made 
the traditional practice of polygamy, not infrequent among old-line AKP 
local cadres, a crime. As episodes such as these reveal, Islam is becom-
ing part of the recasting of a religious global marketplace disconnected 
from local cultures.11
Instead of the secularization of society, we might do better to speak of 
the “autonomization” of politics from religion and of religion from poli-
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tics, due to the diversification of the religious field and the inability to 
reconstruct religion as a political ideology. When religion is everywhere, 
it is nowhere. That was the underlying meaning that I took away from 
what Egyptian parliament speaker and Muslim Brother Saad al-Katatni 
said to a Salafist deputy who wanted to perform the Muslim prayer call 
while the house was in session: “We are all Muslims; if you want to pray 
there is a mosque in parliament, but parliament is not a mosque.”12 The 
paradox of re-Islamization is that it leads to political secularization and 
opens the door to debate about what Islam means. This could lead to the 
reopening of theological debate, but that would be a consequence and not 
a cause of the democratization of Muslim societies. 
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